Sanctum: Towards an Open-Source, Formally-Verified Secure Processor
Recorded 27 September 2017 in Lausanne, Vaud, Switzerland
Event: IC Colloquia - EPFL IC School Colloquia
Architectural isolation can be used to secure computation on a remote secure processor with a private key where the privileged software is potentially malicious as recently deployed by Intel's Software Guard Extensions (SGX). This talk will first describe the Sanctum secure processor architecture, which offers the same promise as SGX, namely strong provable isolation of software modules running concurrently and sharing resources, but protects against an important class of additional software attacks that infer private information by exploiting resource sharing.
The talk will then describe a verification methodology based on a trusted abstract platform (TAP) that formally models idealized enclaves and a parameterized adversary. Machine-checked proofs show that the TAP satisfies the three key security properties needed for secure remote execution: integrity, confidentiality and secure measurement. Machine-checked proofs also show that SGX and Sanctum are refinements of the TAP under certain parameterizations of the adversary, demonstrating these systems implement secure enclaves for the stated adversary models.
Joint work with Victor Costan, Ilia Lebedev, and the Seshia Group at U. C. Berkeley.
Watched 533 times.Watch